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Abstract
Artisanal fishing communities include some of the  ￿poorestArtisanal fishing communities include some of the  ￿poorest of the poor ￿. Using data from gillArtisanal fishing communities include some of the  ￿poorest of the poor ￿. Using data from gill net
fishersfishers in Malaysia, the paper presentsfishers in Malaysia, the paper presents the  first technical efficiency study of an artisanalfishers in Malaysia, the paper presents the  first technical efficiency study of an artisanal fishery and
finds that artisanal fishers are poor, but enjoy a highfinds that artisanal fishers are poor, but enjoy a high level of technical efficiency.  If thefinds that artisanal fishers are poor, but enjoy a high level of technical efficiency.  If the relatively
highhigh levelhigh levelshigh levels of technical efficiency found in the Malaysian gill net fishery exist in other artisanal
fisheries,fisheries,  it suggests that targeted developmentfisheries,  it suggests that targeted development assistance that has traditionally been focussed onfisheries,  it suggests that targeted development assistance that has traditionally been focussed on the
harvesting sector may be better directed to other priorities in artisanal fishing communities.Non-technical Summary
TheThe paper examines the question of whether the focus of development assistance on the harvesting
sectorsector in artisanal fishing communities is appropriate. To address this issue, the studysector in artisanal fishing communities is appropriate. To address this issue, the study provides the
first-ever estimates offirst-ever estimates of technical efficiency, or the abilityfirst-ever estimates of technical efficiency, or the ability of individual vessels to produce maximal
ououtputsoutputs outputs from a given set of inputs, of artisanal fishers. The results indicate that most artisanal gill
netnet fishersnet fishers in a sample of fishers on the west and east coasts of Malaysia  are near to thenet fishers in a sample of fishers on the west and east coasts of Malaysia  are near to the frontier, or
maximummaximum level of technical efficiency,maximum level of technical efficiency, and thusmaximum level of technical efficiency, and thus are close to achieving their highest possible outputs
givengiven theirgiven their technology and input constraints. The estimated technical efficiency measuresgiven their technology and input constraints. The estimated technical efficiency measures were  also
regressedregressed onregressed on a number of vessel, skipper and crew characteristics to better understand theregressed on a number of vessel, skipper and crew characteristics to better understand the factors that
contributecontribute to improved technical efficiency. These regcontribute to improved technical efficiency. These regrecontribute to improved technical efficiency. These regressions suggest that the individual
characteristicscharacteristics of characteristics of  captains appear to be more important on the more isolated and lesscharacteristics of  captains appear to be more important on the more isolated and less developed east
coast,coast, while vessel characteristicscoast, while vessel characteristics appear tocoast, while vessel characteristics appear to be more important in explaining differences in technical
efficiencyefficiency on the west coast. The study suggest thefficiency on the west coast. The study suggest that deveefficiency on the west coast. The study suggest that development assistance to artisanal fisheries
mustmust be locally-based and tailor made to each region,must be locally-based and tailor made to each region, and that targetingmust be locally-based and tailor made to each region, and that targeting such assistance away from
vessel and gear upgrades to other priorities is desirable.1
"...there is little doubt that the problems facing small-scale fishermen in developing countries are
among the most intractable ones in the field of development assistance,..."
 Francis T. Christy (1986; p. 121)
I. INTRODUCTION
Where the land meets the sea, over 200 million artisanal fishers worldwide live and exploit a
complex and varied ecosystem.
1  Dispersed and isolated by geography, artisanal fishing
communities are socially, politically, and culturally marginal to their society.
2  Indeed, artisanal
fishers and their families form some of the  ￿poorest of the poor ￿. Many face difficult conditions for
economic growth and development due to their isolation and poor infrastructure and limited access
to public health, education, and other such services.
In contrast to large-scale commercial fisheries, artisanal fisheries are owner-operated and
labor-intensive, employing rudimentary technologies. Artisanal fishers harvest the sea from
comparatively small vessels, powered by sail, paddles, or outboard motors of limited power, have
limited fishing range, and generally deploy passive fishing gears that are set and later retrieved.  As
with large-scale fisheries, the resources and ecosystems utilized by artisanal fishers are increasingly
over-exploited and degraded from destructive fishing practices, pollution, and changes in land use.
3
Artisanal fisheries are often overcapitalized, and fishing capacity is far in excess of that required to
take the maximum sustainable yield, and even further in excess of that required for economic
efficiency. These problems are compounded by incomplete property rights and conflicts with large-
scale, industrial vessels.
4
The earliest fisheries development strategies focused almost exclusively on large-scale
fisheries, presumably in the belief that artisanal fisheries would expand their scale of production and2
adopt the technologies of large-scale fisheries and fish further offshore or otherwise provide labor to
the operation of large-scale fisheries (Panayotou, 1982; Platteau 1989).  Artisanal fishers were
expected to move from their isolated coastal villages and hamlets to find employment inland and in
cities, and little attention was given to the growing environmental and resource problems associated
with fishing. 
Since the mid-1980s, fisheries development strategies began to focus on artisanal fishers. 
Assistance directed to the harvesting sector aimed to increase the efficiency of traditional fishing
methods, and included aid to introduce or upgrade the motors for traditional craft and to use
monofilament nylon in place of traditional fishing gear (Lawson, 1984; Ishak, 1994; Vincent et al.,
1997).  This approach often involved credit assistance, subsidies for vessels, motors, and gear, and
aid in marketing fish. Despite some successes, a focus on the harvesting sector helped to create a
dependency on the state (Lawson, 1984; Ishak, 1994), contributed to overexploitation of certain fish
stocks, and largely failed to solve the problems of endemic poverty and poor infrastructure in fishing
communities (Panayotou, 1982). 
Given the lessons from the past, what is the preferred approach to promote the development
of artisanal fishing communities?
5  Should the current focus on the harvesting sector be continued or
a strategy for the future be recast? The answer, in part, hinges upon whether artisanal fishers are
technically efficient.  In this paper, we use vessel data from the Malaysian gillnet fishery to estimate
individual measures of technical efficiency. These measures are then regressed on vessel and
skipper characteristics to determine what factors may be contributing to efficiencies in the fishery. 
The results suggest that fishers are largely technically efficient and that development assistance for
artisanal fishing communities focussed on the harvesting sector may be better directed to other
priorities.3
II. THE MALAYSIAN GILL NET FISHERY
The fisheries of Malaysia are highly diverse, comprising a multiplicity of species and gear types.
The most important industrial gear types are trawl (pukat tunda) and purse seine (pukat jerut) nets,
where trawl gear harvest demersal (bottom-dwelling) species and purse seines harvest pelagic
(surface-dwelling) species (Ishak 1994). Demersal fish account for about 30% of the total fish
harvested in Peninsular Malaysia (Kuperan et al. in press). Trawlers and purse seiners together
contributed 81% of total fish landings and 77% of total wholesale value in Peninsular Malaysia in
1996.
The Peninsular Malaysian fishing industry provides a significant source of animal protein,
employment, and to a lesser extent, foreign exchange (Ishak 1994). The west coast fishing grounds
lie largely in Malaysia ￿s Extended Economic Zone in the Straights of Malacca and the Southern
Indian Ocean. The west coast ￿s stocks of shrimp and demersal fish provide the chief attraction for
commercial vessels, and west coast issues have been the principal driving force for Peninsular
Malaysian fishing policy during the last thirty years. The concentration of fishing in inshore waters
led to overfishing off the west coast, beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, fueled by the
introduction of trawling to harvest shrimp for lucrative export markets (Ooi 1990; Ishak 1994).
Landings are increasingly comprised of lower-valued species, especially  ￿trash fish ￿, which are
often discarded at sea with high mortality. Most of the untapped fishery resources are pelagic and lie
offshore. 
Due to open access and a fisheries development policy promoting expansion of fishing
capacity, excess capacity and overfishing have developed in inshore fishing grounds, yielding4
conflicts between large- and small-scale fisheries (Jahara 1988; Ooi 1990; Ishak 1994). Both large-
scale, industrial fisheries, using trawl or purse seine gear and with a clear commercial orientation,
and small-scale (artisanal) fisheries, using traditional gear and with more of a subsistence
orientation, built up a large portion of their fishing capacity to harvest the same resource stocks. In
tropical waters, these resource stocks tend to be concentrated in the shallow, nutrient-rich, readily
accessible inshore waters, and include rich beds of commercially valuable shrimp, which are
harvested largely for export. The large numbers of small-scale fishers are generally confined to
inshore operations by their small vessels, low engine power, and traditional fishing gear. In contrast,
the more limited number of large-scale fishers, with their larger vessels, are often free to fish both
inshore and offshore waters.
II.1. Artisanal Fishing Practices
The artisanal fishing communities examined in this paper are the gill net (pukat hanyut,
pukat hijau, pukat tansi) fisheries on the west and east coasts of the Malaysian peninsula. The gear
type employed in these fisheries is common in Southeast Asia and accounts for over half of all the
gear used in all fisheries in Malaysia (Alam,1991). Throughout Southeast Asia, gill net fishers
employ small boats, often of wood construction, powered by comparatively small motors, usually
outboard, deploy nets usually made of monofilament nylon, and catch a wide variety of species.
Typically in these fisheries, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, gill net vessels set out from the
port, village, or hamlet on what are generally day fishing trips with a limited operating radius. A
captain (Taikong) commands the vessel during the fishing trip and is most often the vessel ￿s owner. 
The captain remains in charge of the fishing vessel, selects, organizes and manages the crew, is
responsible for the security and maintenance of all fishing equipment, provides overall leadership
(Firth, 1975; Alam, 1991) and is often the most knowledgeable and experienced person on board.5
  Fishers employ surface, mid-water and bottom gill nets, depending on the species they are
seeking.
6 Gill nets are set around coastal areas, river mouths or traditional resource-rich fishing
grounds and  ￿soak ￿ for some time, during which fish or prawns swim or are carried by tides and
currents into the net where they become entangled.  After  ￿soaking ￿, the nets are retrieved and the
fish entangled in the mesh are extracted and hauled on board. 
There are various kinds of drift gill nets in use, with mesh sizes ranging from 2.5 to 4 inches
(Bailey 1983). Mesh size varies by net type and can vary within a net because different mesh sizes
can catch different species according to their seasonal variability. The pukat hanyut hangs from the
surface by floats. The pukat hijau has a larger mesh size, is heavier, and is more suitable for the
relatively heavy seas during and immediately after the monsoon period. Both the pukat hanyut and
pukat hijau are used at night, except during the bright phase of the moon when the fish can see the
shadow of the net and avoid it or sharks and dolphins can eat the trapped fish. Hence, fishing stops
or slows during full moons or adverse weather. 
The gill net is let off the stern as the vessel moves slowly away from the coast. The
prevailing currents move up and down the coast, depending on the tides, and so the fish, which
generally swim against the current, become trapped in the nets which run perpendicular to the coast.
A small lantern is placed on a wooden floating platform attached to one end of the net and another
placed on the vessel itself mark the location of net. The net is attached by nylon rope to a string of
plastic floats which allow the net to hang about 3 feet below the surface, with the netting running
about 30 feet deep and of variable length. 
Pukat tansi is a bottom-set gill net used during the day and cast and retrieved many more
times during the day than pukat hanyut, and is used more during the monsoon season since day
fishing is then safer. Pukat hanyut crews tend to be smaller than pukat tansi crews, but all crews are6
often larger than technically required, reflecting the large number of available fishers, many of
whom can call upon ties of kinship or friendship to secure a place.
Upon arrival on shore, the fish and prawns are sold fresh to a variety of local outlets, such as
petty traders, beach markets, and local  ￿open-air ￿ markets; state-sponsored buyers and cooperatives;
and middlemen or brokers. Some fish are retained for home consumption and others may be dried
and subsequently sold.
II.2. Fishing Grounds
Much of the sea off the west coast is comparatively shallow with a muddy and flat sea floor
and is fringed by mangrove swamps and estuaries.  The fishing grounds are bounded by the island of
Sumatra on the opposite side of the Straits, and have been subject to biological and economic over-
fishing (Ishak, 1994; Vincent et al., 1997). The east coast fishing grounds along the South China
Sea are larger in area, face a more severe monsoon, have deeper and rougher waters, more reefs,
fewer prawns, and a coastline more fringed by sandy beaches and coconut palms than the west
coast. West coast fishers exploit the pelagic (migratory), demersal (bottom-dwelling), and prawn
resources while east coast fishers are more likely to harvest pelagic fish (Ooi, 1990).
Social and economic conditions and traditions vary substantially between the east and west
coasts of Peninsular Malaysia. The majority of the manufacturing industries, plantations, tin
reserves, and population are concentrated in the west.  By contrast, the east coast states are more
sparsely populated and relatively underdeveloped.  On both coasts, the widely dispersed fishing
villages are typically located along rivers, estuaries, or at river mouths, which can be isolated and
lack physical, social, and public amenities and infrastructure.  Some fishing communities earn
almost all of their income from marine fishing, while others make their livelihood by combining
fishing, farming, aquaculture, gathering from mangrove forests and coral reefs, and working on7
plantations or rice farms.
III. MODEL AND DATA
To better understand the value of development policies in artisanal fishing communities, we use a
data set of individual landings, crew and vessel characteristics in the Malaysian gill net fishery to
assess the constraints facing fishers and to estimate measures of technical efficiency. For each
vessel, its efficiency is measured relative to its ability to produce on the fleet ￿s best-practice frontier,
the maximum output possible from a given set of inputs and production technology (Aigner et al.
1977, Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). 
The approach used to obtain measures of technical efficiency is to estimate a stochastic
frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000), where technical inefficiency is measured as the deviation of
an individual vessel ￿s production from the best-practice production frontier. In this approach,
production is assumed to be stochastic because fishing is sensitive to random factors such as
weather, resource availability, and environmental influences.
Due to differences in resource abundance and availability, species composition, ecosystems,
weather, and socioeconomic conditions between the two coasts in the Malaysian gillnet fishery, two
separate stochastic production frontiers with a translog functional form are specified, one for each
coast:
7
   lnYi =  ￿±0 + ￿±1ln Ki + ￿±2ln Li + ￿±3ln Ti + ￿±4ln Ni + ￿±5ln ODi + ￿±6ln Ki
2 + ￿±7ln Li 
2 + ￿±8ln Ti 
2 (1)    
+ ￿±9ln Ni
2  + ￿±10ln Ki ln Li + ￿±11ln Ki ln Ti + ￿±12ln Ki ln Ni + ￿±13ln Li ln Ti + ￿±14ln Li ln Ni 
+ ￿±15ln Ti ln Ni + ￿µi ,
for vessel (firm) i and where symmetry has been imposed by ￿±jk = ￿±kj  and j,k = K,L,N,T.  Total8
output (catch) in kilograms is denoted by Yi and is the geometric mean of fifteen species of fish plus
prawns (where revenue shares serve as weights).  The inputs are specified as service flows by
multiplying the stocks of capital and labor by days at sea.
8  The vessel capital stock (Ki) is a
volumetric measure given by vessel gross registered tons (GRT); labor (Li) is the number of crew
employed per vessel for the month, including the captain; and the gill net capital stock (Ni) is
measured by its length in meters multiplied by the number of hauls of the gill net per day.
9  The
number of trips per month (Ti) represents variable input usage (e.g., diesel and/or gasoline, lubricant
and/or oil, ice, container/polythene, and miscellaneous variable inputs).  
Distance from shore to the fishing ground is specified in nautical miles (ODi) and is intended
to capture environmental effects, providing for differences in resource conditions that vary by
distance from shore and by water depth.
10 The effects of OD on the level of catch can be expected to
vary by coast, depending on the topography of the ocean bottom, currents, demographic structure of
the population, species of fish, and extent of depletion of inshore waters. In addition, prawns, which
are a more valuable component of catch on the west coast than on the east coast, are found close to
shore.
The error term ￿µ i in Equation (1) is defined as ￿µ i = Vi - Ui, where  Ui, and  Vi are distributed
independently of both each other and the regressors in Equation (1).  The two-sided error term Vi
captures exogenous stochastic shocks and is assumed to be symmetrical and independently and
identically distributed as N(0, ￿Ã V
2)
.. The non-negative error term Ui captures differences in technical
inefficiency and is assumed to be an independently distributed non-negative random variable, such
that Ui is the truncation of a normal distribution at zero, with mean ￿¼i  = Zi￿´ and variance ￿Ã U
2,
N(Zi￿´,￿Ã U
2). The one-sided non-negative random variable, Ui, representing technical inefficiency,
must be non-negative so that no firm can perform better than the best-practice frontier. The9
independent distribution of Vi and Ui allows for the separation of noise and technical inefficiency. Zi
defines a (1xM) vector of explanatory variables associated with the technical inefficiency function,
and ￿´ is an (Mx1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated (Battese and Coelli 1995).
The technical inefficiency calculated from the stochastic production frontier, Equation (1), 
may be a function of explanatory variables and regressed against these variables in a separate and
subsequent regression. However, Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin (1991) and Reifschneider and
Stevenson (1991) first noted the inconsistency between inefficiency effects when two independent
and separate regressions are performed. In the first stage of a two-step estimation, the error is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed, but the predicted inefficiency effects in the
second stage are specified as a function of a number of firm-specific factors implying the errors are
not identically distributed. For this reason, and as described in detail in Coelli et al.(1998), we
estimate both (1) and (2) jointly using maximum likelihood estimation.
Technical inefficiency for each firm i, Ui, is defined as the ratio of actual output to the
potential frontier output. Ui is not directly observable, but Jondrow et al. (1982) found its expected
value of Ui conditional on the value of ￿µ i  = Vi - Ui, i.e., E[Uiÿÿ  ￿µ i]. Technical efficiency for each
firm is defined as TEi = exp(-Ui) = exp(-Zi ￿´  - Wi), where exp is the exponential operator (Battese
and Coelli 1988). The range of technical efficiency for firm i (TEi) is 0 "d  TEi  "d 1, where TEi = 1
represents the achievement of maximum output (adjusted for random fluctuations) for the given
inputs, or 100 percent efficiency.
The technical inefficiency function, comprised of the vector of variables Z which are
hypothesized to affect the technical efficiency of vessels, is specified by:
  U =  ￿´0 + ￿´1EXLIH + ￿´2EXLIE + ￿´3EXLIN +  ￿´4FEXP + ￿´5MESH + ￿´6FSIZE   (2)   
 10
                   + ￿´7DCH + ￿´8DCT + ￿´9DNOP + ￿´10DSM + ￿´11DP + ￿´12DS + ￿´13DB.
U is the vessel-level technical inefficiency measure; EXLIH, EXLIE, and EXLIN are the 
remaining economic life, in years, of the vessel hull, engine, and gill net as estimated by
respondents; FEXP is years of fishing experience for the captain; MESH is mesh size in meters; and
FSIZE is the family size of the captain. The seven D terms are dummy variables and are equal to
one when: the vessel has a Chinese captain (CH); the captain has participated in a Malaysian fisher
training program (CT); the captain is not the owner of the vessel (NOP); the vessel is small (SM)--
defined as less than 5 and 10 GRT, respectively, for the west and east coasts; the captain has a
primary education (P); the captain has a secondary education (S) (none of the captains of the east
coast vessels received a secondary education); and on the west coast, if the engine brand is any other
than Yanmar (B).
11 The intercept ￿´0 captures the case of a Malay captain, who own and operates the
vessel, did not participate in the training program, does not have a formal education, and has a
Yanmar engine.
12  A random error term was added to Equation (2) for estimation, and both (1) and
(2) were jointly estimated by maximum likelihood using Frontier 4.1 (Coelli 1996), under the
behavioral hypothesis that fishers maximize expected profits (Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze 1966), as
described in Coelli et al. (pp. 207-208,1998).
The specification of technical inefficiency as unexpected and unknown, or as expected and
foreseen, when the firm chooses its inputs affects the specification and estimation of the production
function (Kumbhakar 1987). Given the overwhelming importance of  ￿captain ￿s skill ￿ in locating
and catching fish and the inherent stochastic effects from weather, temperature, and biological
variations in fishing (Campbell 1991), it is likely that technical inefficiency that is unforseen is more
important than the foreseen. The point is that technical inefficiency is likely to be never entirely11
foreseen or unforseen, but in fishing, technical inefficiency is more likely to be unexpected and
unknown. Thus we specify the technical inefficiency as unexpected or unforseen. Given unknown
and unexpected technical inefficiency, the argument of expected profit maximization (Zellner,
Kmenta, and Dreze 1966) can be used to treat inputs as exogenous (Kumbhakar 1987, p. 336). If
technical inefficiency is known to the firm, estimates of the production function parameters obtained
directly from the profit function will be inconsistent.
Several hypotheses about the model can be tested using generalized likelihood ratio tests.
The first null hypothesis is whether or not technical inefficiency effects are absent (￿Ã U
 2 = 0). This
test is performed against the full translog stochastic frontier given in Equation (1). This null
hypothesis is specified as ￿³ = 0, where ￿³ = ￿Ã U 
2/(￿Ã V
2 + ￿Ã U
 2) and lies between 0 and 1. If we fail to
reject the null hypothesis, H0: ￿³ = 0, then the Ui term should be removed from the model (Battese
and Coelli 1995) and the stochastic production frontier is rejected in favor of ordinary least squares
estimation of the average production function in which the explanatory variables in technical
inefficiency function (Zi) are included in the production function.
13 
The second null hypothesis is whether or not the functional form of the stochastic production
frontier, Equation (1), is Cobb-Douglas form. This null hypothesis, which is tested against the full
translog form, is H0: a6 = a7 = "￿ "￿ "￿ = a15= 0 in Equation (1), i.e., all of the input interaction and
second-order terms equal 0. There are 10 degrees of freedom, since there are 10 independent
restrictions. The third null hypothesis is whether or not the technical inefficiency function, Equation
(2), is influenced by the level of explanatory variables, and is tested with the final form of the
stochastic production frontier (i.e., against either the translog or Cobb Douglas). Under the
assumption that the inefficiency effects are distributed as a truncated normal, the null hypothesis is12
that the matrix of parameters, excluding the intercept term ￿´0, is null such that, H0: ￿´1 = ￿´2  =...= d13
= 0.
III.1. Data
The cross-sectional data used in the study were collected in 1988 using a multi-stage
sampling procedure. The first stage of the sampling selected the states and the districts within the
states where the fishers would be sampled and the second stage selected gill net fisheries within
states where the sampling took place.  The first stage used the Annual Fisheries Statistics of the
Department of Fisheries, Malaysia, which provides statistics on landings of marine fish, number of
licensed fishing boats and gears, number of fishers, and a host of other related information by
fisheries districts, states, and fishing gears. Based on the criteria of gear concentration and their
contribution to fisheries production and revenue, the states selected were Terengganu and Pahang
from the east coast and Johor, Perak, Kedah, and Perlis from the west coast. The fisheries districts
within the states were also chosen based on the same criteria.
14
In the second stage, vessels were randomly selected from lists of licensed gill net vessels
obtained from the Department of Fisheries and the fisher cooperative associations. After pretesting
the questionnaire, vessel owners were interviewed and provided information on one month's fishing
activity. The data were collected during the period from August to October, 1988. 
All variables are self-reported. Moreover, data on artisanal fisheries are very difficult to
obtain due to the great isolation of many villages and hamlets. This difficulty, coupled with the
absence of formal record keeping by artisanal fishers, precludes data requests for periods of time
longer than about a month or from very far in the past. Ideally, artisanal fisheries would be
repeatedly sampled, but these types of data collection programs are very rare. Alam (1991) provides13
further details about the data and sampling procedure. The 40 west coast fishers came from the
states of Perak (15 fishers), Kedah (10 fishers), and Perlis (15 fishers) while the 42 east coast fishers
came from the states of Terengganu (23 fishers), East Johor (10 fishers), and Pahang (9 fishers).
Summary statistics of the data, reported in Table 1, indicate that the vessels used in the
fishery are relatively small, with mean lengths of 10-12 meters, and that the captains on both coasts
have considerable fishing experience. Compared to west coast vessels, east coast vessels are longer
with larger GRTs and engine power, possess larger nets, operate further from shore, have larger
crews, catch more fish, have larger revenues, and are more capital-intensive as measured by a larger
capital-labor (GRT/fisher) ratio. This larger scale of operation reflects the larger and deeper South
China Sea, the existence of fewer estuaries and coastal wetlands and sandier ocean bottom in
comparison to the Straits of Malacca, and greater severity of monsoons. East coast vessel hulls,
engines, and nets also have longer expected remaining economic lives than those of the west coast.
West coast vessels make more frequent hauls of their shorter nets per day than do east coast vessels
and tend to fish closer to shore and use smaller mesh sizes, thereby catching smaller fish.  Both east
and west coast vessels, however, fish about the same number of days per month.  A greater
proportion of east coast skippers are Chinese, rather than Malay, have larger families, have more
years of fishing experience, but have fewer years of formal education.  About the same proportion
of captains are owner-operators on the west and east coasts. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The hypotheses about the model are tested using generalized likelihood ratio tests which are14
summarized in Table 2.  The hypothesis tests indicate that for both coasts, at the one percent level
of significance: (1) the stochastic production frontier is appropriate (H0: ￿³ = 0 is rejected); (2) the
translog functional form is suitable for the stochastic production frontier (H0: ￿±6 = ￿±7 = "￿ "￿ "￿ = ￿±15 =
0, i.e., the Cobb-Douglas functional form,  is rejected); and (3), the technical inefficiency function
depends on the vector of explanatory variables (H0: ￿´1 = ￿´2 =  "￿ "￿ "￿ =  ￿´M  = 0 is rejected).
15
Parameter estimates of the final form of the stochastic production frontier, Equation (1), are
reported in Table 3. 
Parameter estimates of flexible functional forms by themselves convey little meaning.
However, the first-order variable OD (operating distance from shore) does not have any interaction
terms, so that its parameter estimates are more meaningful. On the east coast, OD had a positive and
clearly statistically significant estimated coefficient, but on the west coast, OD has a negative and
marginally statistically significant estimated coefficient. One possible explanation is that on the
west coast, prawns form a much more important component of the catch and are found close to
shore, so that fishing farther from shore reduces catch. On the east coast, fewer nutrients reach
inshore waters, the bottom is sandier, reefs are found farther offshore, and most of the catch is
comprised of small pelagic species of fish, which can be found farther offshore than prawns on the
west coast.
The distribution of technical efficiency scores, relative to the best practice frontier scores
and reported in Table 4, is similar for both coasts.  Technical efficiency scores are skewed towards
higher levels of efficiency, where a score of 1.0 lies on the frontier, with concentrations in the 80
th
and 90
th percentiles for both east and west coast vessels.  Only a limited number of vessels display
substantially lower levels of technical efficiency.  The arithmetic means of the individual technical15
efficiency scores are 0.84 and 0.88 for the east and west coasts, and are somewhat higher than those
generally found from stochastic frontiers for developing country agriculture (Ali and Byerlee 1991;
Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro 1994, Table 1).  The comparatively high level of technical efficiency is
consistent with Schultz ￿s (1964) thesis of  ￿poor and efficient ￿ smallholders and peasants in
developing country agriculture.  In sum, the vast majority of the artisanal fishers have high levels of
technical efficiency and face limited scope for technical efficiency gains, given the state of their
technology and resource conditions.
The factors affecting technical inefficiency can be analyzed by the magnitude, algebraic
sign, and significance of the estimated coefficients in Equation (2), the technical inefficiency
function, which are reported in Table 5.  The dependent variable is technical inefficiency as opposed
to technical efficiency, so that a negative sign indicates a decrease in technical inefficiency or an
increase in technical efficiency.  These results are summarized into three broad areas: the expected
life or vintage of the vessel, the characteristics of the captain, and vessel ownership.
IV.1. Vintage of Capital Stock 
A vessel of an older vintage, embodying an older state of technology, (construction material, hull
design, size, configuration for sail or engine) may preclude that vessel from employing best-practice
techniques of production, determined in part by the best-practice technology. To capture the effects
of capital vintage for the hull, the estimated remaining economic life, in years, for the hull (EXLIH)
was introduced in Equation (2), where a longer remaining economic life is taken to represent a
newer capital vintage.
16 Similar  ￿vintage ￿ variables were included for the engine (EXLIE) and  net
(EXLIN).
17 
The variables EXLIH and EXLIN are statistically significant on the west coast, but only16
EXLIE is significant for the east coast (Table 5).  The positive sign for the EXLIH on the west coast
is contrary to expectations and suggests that an increase in economic life of the vessel hulls
decreases  efficiency.
18 One possible explanation is that in the artisanal gill net fisheries, a learning
period may be required to master a new vessel and utilize its capabilities to its fullest extent. All
coefficient values are, however, comparatively small, suggesting that those variables which are
significant, minimally affect efficiency.
IV.2. Technical Inefficiency and Captains
The captain ￿s fishing skill is often considered to be an important determinant of a vessel ￿s catch and
efficiency.  Technical inefficiency can be related to characteristics of captains, which comprise the
components of a captain ￿s human capital in Equation (2).
IV.2.1. Ethnicity of Captain:  Ethnicity of captains may explain different fishing practices and 
variations in efficiency across vessels.  Each ethnic group is more likely to have crews of its own
ethnic group. The dummy variable for Chinese ethnicity (DCH) in Equation (2) was not significant
for the east coast, but was negative and significant for the west coast, indicating that Chinese
skippers increase efficiency on west coast but not east coast vessels (Table 5).
19  
IV.2.2. Fishing Experience of Captains:  Fishing experience of captains often provides better
knowledge about the location of fish, weather patterns, currents and tides, bottom conditions, and
how to best catch the fish.  The variable for years of fishing experience (FEXP) was insignificant on
the west coast, but negative and significant on the east coast (Table 5) which indicates greater
experience increases efficiency.  East coast fishers travel further out to sea in more difficult
conditions and in larger boats, so that the captain ￿s expertise may play a more important role than in
the west coast, where most fishing is much more confined to estuaries, river mouths, and nearshore17
fishing grounds. 
IV.2.3. Formal Education of the Captain:  Additional schooling can improve literacy and cognitive
skills which may reduce technical inefficiency by increasing the ability of captains to adopt
technical innovations.  Dummy variables for a captain ￿s formal primary (DP)  and secondary (DS)
education were, however, both insignificant on the west coast, but DP for the east coast (no fishers
in the sample had secondary education on the east coast) was negative and significant (Table 5). 
Thus, education appears not to affect efficiency of fishers on the west coast, but does increase
technical efficiency on the east coast.
20 The differences may be explained by the relative isolation
and lack of infrastructure on the east coast, where primary schooling may offer one of the few
opportunities to learn skills that may be more readily learnt by fishers on the west coast outside of
formal schooling.
IV.2.4. Participation of Captains in Training Programs:  The Malaysian government has
implemented a number of training programs for fishers to improve efficiency and increase incomes
(Ishak, 1994). The dummy variable for captain ￿s training (DCT) is insignificant for the east coast but
is positive, comparatively large, and significant on the west coast (Table 5), indicating a reduction
in efficiency.
21 The contrary result on the west coast may be due to the lack of participation of the
most successful captains in training programs, and thus the real impact of fisher training may be
disguised. Whatever the reason, the results do not provide evidence that participation in training
programs by captains increases technical efficiency.
IV.2.5. Captains ￿ Family Size:  The size of a fisher ￿s family may provide information on an
individual fisher ￿s characteristics, including income and access to family labor.  Family size
(FSIZE) does not  significantly affect efficiency on the west coast, but is negative and significant on18
the east coast, suggesting that an increase in family size increases efficiency (Table 5).  On the more
isolated east coast, a larger family may provide fishing captains with greater flexibility as to when to
fish, while crew who are family members may work more cooperatively and exert greater effort
when fishing.
IV.3. Technical Inefficiency and Vessel Ownership
Both owning and operating a vessel can affect incentives. The non-owner-operator dummy variable
(DNOP) is insignificant in explaining differences in technical inefficiency for both coasts (Table 5).
Thus, Marshallian disincentives sometimes attributed to share contracts in agriculture do not appear
to exist in the Malaysian gillnet fishery.
22 
IV.4. Technical Inefficiency and Vessel Size
The relationship between inefficiency and farm size has received considerable attention in the
agricultural and development economics literature (Barrett, 1996 and Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro,
1993 give recent surveys), but the comparable relationship between inefficiency and vessel size in
the fisheries and development economics literature remains unexamined.  The regressions indicate
that in the Malaysian gillnet fishery the small vessel dummy variable (DSM) was insignificant for the
west coast, but was significant and negative for the east coast (Table 5).  Thus on the east coast,
smaller vessels are more technically efficient than larger vessels.  
The result may, in part, be attributed to differences in the fuel used, crew and mesh sizes,
and resource abundance across vessel-size classes.  Operating larger vessels, but with the same gear,
may also impose coordination costs which may reduce technical efficiency. The results do not,
however, suggest that efficiency changes with the level of capitalization, as defined by the
capital/labor  (GRT/fisher) ratio.  Although the capital-labor ratio is higher on the east than the west19
coast, it is lower on both coasts for the small vessel size class (Table 1) and does not appear to be
related to the level of technical inefficiency (Table 4).
IV.5. Technical Inefficiency and Engine Brand
The dummy variable for engine brands other than Yanmar on the west coast (DB) is negative,
significant, and comparatively large. Engines other than Yanmar increase efficiency. Data
limitations prevent further investigation of how the brand of engine affects efficiency and whether it
is a proxy for other variables.
IV.6. Differences between Coasts
Important differences exist in the variables that affect technical inefficiency on the two coasts. 
Individual characteristics of  captains -- proxies of  human capital, appear to be more important on
the more isolated and less developed east coast while vessel characteristics-- proxies of physical
capital, appear to be more important in explaining differences in technical efficiency on the west
coast. On neither coast, however, do fisher training programs provide a positive and significant
impact in terms of technical efficiency.  The differences imply that a uniform and national fisheries
development strategy is likely to be much less successful than targeted regional or local
development strategies. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results suggest that, paradoxically, the most preferred form of assistance to artisanal fishing
communities may be to redirect aid and development efforts away from the fishing and the
harvesting sector. Short of completely transforming the fishery with a different method of20
harvesting fish, development strategies that focus on upgrading the vessel, engine, and gear and
training fishers may provide few or no benefits in raising efficiency. This result goes beyond the
existing literature which stresses the negative consequences of increasing harvesting in over-fished
artisanal fisheries (Smith, 1979) and the potential for technological change to affect traditional
structures in communities (Lawson, 1984). 
If the sustainable catch is fixed, improved technical efficiency is a benefit only if resources
are freed from the catching sector for productive use elsewhere.  Because there is a general labor
surplus in the coastal areas, partly due to immobility, efficiency improvements may only generate
widespread benefits if they are capital saving.  Although no general relationship exists between the
capital-labor ratio and efficiency on either coast, efficiency improvements may be capital saving for
the smaller vessels on the least developed east coast where smaller and older east coast vessels are
more technically efficient.
23  To the extent that results from the Malaysian gillnet fishery can be
generalized, the study suggests that greater levels of human capital (as proxied by formal education
and fishing experience) may generate the greatest benefits in less developed regions where
education attainment is less and economic opportunities outside of fishing are fewer.
A strategy that redirects priorities away from technological innovation, capital formation,
and improving efficiency in the harvest sector contrasts with the past development approaches in
agriculture where technological innovations, such as the introduction of high-yielding varieties and
mechanization, have traditionally been viewed as critically important to improving the welfare of
farm households.  In the case of agriculture, and in direct contrast to artisanal fisheries, the  ￿poor
and efficient ￿ hypothesis implies that raising the incomes of farm households can be effectively
accomplished through technical innovation, capital formation, and raising efficiency without21
endangering the resource base. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using individual vessel data from the Malaysian gill net, the study finds that most fishers exhibit a
high degree of technical efficiency. Moreover,  the factors explaining efficiency significantly differ
by region and overall level of economic development.  For instance,  in the poorer and less
developed east coast primary schooling of the skipper, smaller vessel size and larger family size
significantly increase technical efficiency, but this is not true for west coast. If these results hold
true in other artisanal fisheries with similar technology and environments, it would suggest that
South East Asian gill net fishers are  ￿poor and efficient ￿, but the factors that contribute to technical
efficiency differ considerably by locality. 
The potential implications from our findings is that development projects targeted to
artisanal fisheries must be locally-based and tailor made by region rather a broad and  ￿one size fits
all ￿ approach to fisheries development. Further, the results suggest that targeted assistance to human
and social capital and away from vessel and gear upgrades, may yield greater efficiency payoffs for
artisanal fishers. Further, if the relatively high levels of technical efficiency found in the Malaysian
gill net fishery exist in other artisanal fisheries,  it suggests that targeted development assistance that
has traditionally been focussed on the harvesting sector may be better directed to other priorities in
artisanal fishing communities.22
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TABLE 1
 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE DATA
East Coast
Vessel and fishing characteristics  Mean         St. Dev.        Minimum          Maximum
Hull length (meters) 12.17 1.82                     8                      15
Gross registered tons                             10.57 3.62                     3                      18
Engine horsepower                                25.79     8.87                    8                      37
Length of net (meters) 712.07     318.14               250                 1400
Mesh size (meters)                               0.0987    0.0086                0.06                 0.11
Remaining economic life: hull (yrs) 18.57          2.87                    13                    25
Remaining economic life: engine (yrs) 15.62          3.81                    10                    25
Remaining economic life: net (yrs) 6.83           1.73                      4                     10
Years of ownership: hull 8.12          3.96                       0                    18
Years of ownership: engine 7.10          2.86                       1                    14
Years of ownership: net 4.93          2.35                       2                    10
No. of fishing trips per month  19.14        5.16                       7                    25
Total fishing days per month 21.83         2.59                    15                    25
Trip duration (days) per month 1.14         5.70                       1                      3
Hauls of net per day 1.95         0.82                       1                     4
GRT-days per month 233.03         86.35                     54                  375
Labor-days per month                             69.86       18.10                     30                  100
Net-haul-days per month 29018.43     18560.5                7500               86400
Operating distance (nautical miles)            9.57         5.12                       3                     20
Crew size (including captain) 3.17      0.62                       2                       4
GRT-crew size (capital-labor) ratio              3.31 0.87                      1.50                  5.33
GRT-crew size ratio vessels < 10 GRT         2.60 0.58                      1.50                  3.50 
Catch of all species per month (kg) 2177.36     484.32                   1190                3165     
Revenue all species per month (M$) 387,591     79,628                   213,900         541,260
Family size of captain  7             2.35                       3                    13
Fishing experience of captain (years) 22.67         7.49                      10                   35  
Number of total observations 42
Number of captains with training 3                (7%)                
Number of Malay captains 5                         (12%)
Number of Chinese captains 37              (88%)
Number of owner-operators 34               (81%)
Number of non-owner-operators 8              (19%)
Number of respondents with:
No schooling                                 9              (21%)
Primary schooling                        33              (79%)
Secondary schooling                      0                           (0%)
Number of vessels < 10 GRT                   17                       (40%)
Notes:  1. GRT-days is number of days at sea per month multiplied by GRT of vessel. 
2. Labor-days is number of days at sea per month multiplied by crew size. 
3. Net-haul-days is number of days at sea per month multiplied by net size and number of hauls per day.
Source: Alam (1991).26
TABLE 1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE DATA (continued...)
West Coast
Vessel and fishing characteristics            Mean         St. Dev.        Minimum          Maximum
Hull length (meters)                               10.50         1.83                     7                      13
Gross registered tons                              6.33           3.01                     2                      15
Engine horsepower                                17.35          7.81                    4                      36
Length of net (meters)                         586.10      297.61                 200                  1200
Mesh size (meters)                               0.0881     0.0189                 0.06                 0.11
Remaining economic life: hull (yrs)              17.53      1.93                     15                    21        
Remaining economic life: engine (yrs)         12.50         2.48                    8                     18
Remaining economic life: net (yrs)           8.43         1.65                      6                     12      
Years of ownership: hull                          5.93          3.02                      1                     12
Years of ownership: engine                      4.65          2.96                      0                     13
Years of ownership: net                           3.00          1.99                      0                      7
No. of fishing trips per month                 17.43         4.91                      7                     26
Total fishing days per month                   21.68         3.16                    15                   27
Trip duration (days) per month                 1.24         3.97                      1                       3
Hauls of net per day                                  3.23         0.73                      1                      4
GRT-days per month 133.65        61.55                    40                   300           
Labor-days per month                            53.43       14.74                    30                      81
Net-haul-days per month                          38561.6     18820.8              14400             100800
Operating distance (nautical miles)            5.33        3.03                       2                     14
Crew size (including captain)                    2.45        0.50                       2                       4
GRT-crew size (capital-labor) ratio              2.70 1.51                      0.67                7.50
 GRT-crew size ratio vessels < 5 GRT           1.21  0.43                      0.67                  2.00 
Catch of all species per month (kg)            819.35     256.66                   478                1620   
Revenue of all species per month (M$)      175,757   52,584                82,835             310,350
Family size of captain                               5.80         2.15                      2                      12
Fishing experience of captain (years)  14.40        7.09                      3                      33
Number of total observations                      40
Number of captains with training               5                         (12%)               
Number of Malay captains                        14                       (35%)
Number of Chinese captains                     26                       (65%)
Number of owner-operators                     31                       (77%)
Number of non-owner-operators               9                         (22%)
Number of respondents with:
No schooling                                 2                           (5%)
Primary schooling                        31                       (77%)
Secondary schooling                      7                         (18%)
Number of vessels < 5 GRT                     11                       (28%)
Notes:  1. GRT-days is number of days at sea per month multiplied by GRT of vessel. 
2.  Labor-days is number of days at sea per month multiplied by crew size. 
3.  Net-haul-days- is number of days at sea per month multiplied by net size and number of hauls per day.
Source: Alam (1991).27
TABLE 2
GENERALIZED LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS OF HYPOTHESES OF THE PARAMETERS OF THE
  STOCHASTIC FRONTIER PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY FUNCTION
East Coast
Null Hypothesis                        Likelihood Ratio    df         Critical Value (5%)        Critical Value (1%)
1.  ￿³  =  0                                           62.309           2                    5.138                            8.273        
    (No stochastic frontier)
2.  ￿±6 = ￿±7 = ...= ￿±15 = 0                      58.199          10                  18.307                          23.209
    (Cobb-Douglas frontier)
3.  ￿´1 =  ￿´ 2  =  ....   =  ￿´ 11  = 0                 56.114          11                  19.675                          24.725     
    (No technical inefficiency fn.)
Notes:  1. Test for ￿³  =  0 follows mixed chi-square distribution with critical values found in Table 1 of
Kodde and Palm [1986]. 
2. Df = degrees of freedom. 
3. A truncated-normal distribution is assumed for the technical inefficiency error term.
     West Coast
Null Hypothesis                        Likelihood Ratio    df       Critical Value (5%)      Critical Value (1%)
1.  ￿³  =  0                                         30.179            2                 5.138                         8.273
    (No stochastic frontier)
2.  ￿±6 = ￿±7 = ...= ￿±15 = 0                    30.913          10                18.307                       23.209
    (Cobb-Douglas frontier)
3.    ￿´1 =  ￿´ 2  =  ....   =  ￿´ 13  = 0             30.099          13                22.362                       27.688
    (No technical inefficiency fn.)
Notes:  1. Test for ￿³  =  0 follows mixed chi-square distribution with critical values found in Table 1 of
Kodde and Palm [1986].
 2. Df = degrees of freedom. 
3. A truncated-normal distribution is assumed for the technical inefficiency error term.28
TABLE 3
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION FRONTIER
                                                   East Coast                                                 West Coast
                                 ------------------------------------------        ------------------------------------------
Variables                  Coefficient     Std.  Error      t-Ratio         Coefficient      Std. Error     t-Ratio
Intercept                     10.5913           0.9057        11.694             12.7098         0.9746        13.040
ln K                              5.0371           0.9200          5.475              4.7873          1.0054          4.761
ln L                             -4.7997           0.8222         -5.838             -7.4008         0.8621         -8.584
ln T                              2.0509           0.8557          2.397              -3.5336         0.9736         -3.629
ln N                             -2.4563          0.8818         -2.785              1.2196         0.7266           1.678
ln OD                           0.6650           0.1533          4.337             -0.2487        0.1298          -1.916 
ln K
2                                 -0.4395          0.4154         -1.058               0.7444         0.2266         3.286
ln L
2 
              -1.2599          0.1821         -6.918             -0.2749         0.3955         -0.695
ln T
2                            -0.1317          0.0814         -1.617             -0.5990         0.1556         -3.849
ln N
2                            -0.9716          0.4107         -2.366             -0.5460        0.2408          -2.268
ln K* ln L                     0.1949          0.2175          0.896             -1.3288        0.3558          -3.734
ln K*ln T                     -1.0061          0.2573         -3.910              0.4441        0.2747           1.617
ln K*ln N                      0.9470          0.3625          2.612              0.5746        0.4867           1.181
ln L*ln T                       1.6993          0.3055          5.562              0.2487        0.2304           1.080
ln L*ln N                      -0.0108         0.0910         -0.118              1.2194        0.3344           3.647
ln T*ln N                       0.0464         0.0463          1.069              0.0950        0.0696            1.364
￿Ã
2                                   0.0491         0.0139           2.997              0.0127       0.0042            3.009
￿³                                    0.9999         0.0001        24340.6             0.3380       0.1372            2.464
log-likelihood                47.5686                                                   37.1789
No. of observations            42                                                            40
Notes: 1. K = GRT-days (tens), L = labor-days, N = net-haul-days (hundreds), T = No. of trips, 
            OD = operating distance from shore. 
            2. Translog functional form.29
TABLE 4 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY SCORES
                                     East Coast
                                                                              Captain     Captain             Owner-      Small       Mean Years of
                                                          Mean           Training    Education         Operator    Vessel       Expected Life         Capital-Labor Ratio
                               Fishing        ----------    -----------------    ----------     --------     ---------------------     -------------------------
Range         Total    Malay   Chinese  Experience   Yes  No   None  Primary     Yes  No   Yes No   Hull    Engine  Net      Mean   Min    Max
0.90 - 0.99    21          3          18         23.76           2    19        2        19           17    4       10    1    19.44  16.67   7.71     3.33    1.50    5.33
0.80 - 0.89      6          0            6         18.67           1      5        2          4            4     2         3    3    18.17  16.83   5.83     3.28     2.50    4.00
0.70 - 0.79      5          0            5         23.00           0      5        1          4            5     0         0    5    17.60  15.40   5.40     3.93     3.00    4.67
0.60 - 0.69      2          1            1         24.50           0      2        1          1            2     0         1    1    22.50  12.50   6.50     3.00     2.67    3.33
0.50 - 0.59      8          1            7         21.13           0      8        3          5            6     2         1    7    17.00  12.88   6.25     3.56     2.00    4.50
Mean:  0.84    Minimum:  0.50     Maximum:  0.99
Notes:  1. Measures are in terms of efficiency and not inefficiency. 
2. Small vessels < 10 gross registered tons. 
3. Fishing experience of captain in years.
            4. Capital-labor ratio is GRT/fisher.
      West Coast                                 
                                                                      Captain           Captain                   Owner-    Small    Mean Years of      Yanmar     Capital-Labor
Ratio
                                                   Mean          Training          Education               Operator  Vessel    Expected Life       Engine      
                      Fishing       ---------- ------------------------------- -----------  --------   ---------------------    ----------  -----------------
---------------
Range      Total  Malay  Chinese Experience Yes  No  None Primary Secondary   Yes  No  Yes No  Hull   Engine  Net   Yes   Mean Min Max
0.90-0.99   21       5          16          9.76         1     20      2       12            7             16    5     6   15  17.3 12.8  8.8   15     2.43  1.00 7.50
0.80-0.89     9       3           6         21.11         2      7       0         9            0              8     1     2    7  17.8   12.4  8.78   7      2.75 1.00 4.50
0.70-0.79     5       4           1         18.80         0      5       0         5            0              4     1     1    4   16.8 11.2  7.0    4       4.30 3.50 5.50
0.60-0.69     4       2           2         16.25         1      3       0         4            0              4     0     1    3   18.8   13.0  7.50   4      2.89 0.67 3.31
0.50-0.59     1       0           1         10.00         1      0       0         1            0              1     0     1    0   18.0   11.0  8.00   1      2.22 2.22 2.22
Mean:  0.88   Minimum:  0.57   Maximum:  0.99
Notes:  1. Measures are in terms of efficiency and not inefficiency. 
2. Small vessels < 5 gross registered tons. 
3. Fishing experience of captain in years.
4. Capital-labor ratio is GRT/fisher.30
TABLE 5 
ESTIMATED TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY FUNCTION
                                                                               East Coast                                 West Coast
                      -----------------------------------     --------------------------------------
Variable                                                  Coefficient   St. Error   t-Ratio    Coefficient    St. Error    t-Ratio
Intercept  ￿±0                                              4.1338        0.7067      5.849    -0.6221 0.4441 -1.401
Remaining economic life: hull            -0.0261       0.0277     -0.939       0.0472 0.0169 2.788
(years) (EXLIH)
Remaining economic life: engine            -0.0981       0.0262     -3.744       0.0273 0.0165 1.682
(years) (EXLIE)
Remaining economic life: net                -0.0366       0.0479     -0.765      -0.0711 0.0259  -2.747
(years) (EXLIN)
Fishing experience (years) (FEXP)           -0.0254       0.0110     -2.306       0.0107 0.0065 1.637
Mesh size (meters) (MESH)                      0.4247       0.9968      0.426        0.3972 0.9859 0.403 
Family size of captain (persons) (FSIZE) -0.0766       0.0363     -2.113      -0.0333 0.0220 -1.510
Dummy variables for:
     Chinese captain (DCH )                         -0.4335        0.2264     -1.915      -0.2546 0.0981 -2.595
     Non-owner-operator (DNOP )                 -0.0847        0.2296     -0.368       0.0224 0.0828 0.271
     Captain training (DCT )                         -0.4763        0.4856     -0.981       0.4024 0.1244 3.235
  
     Small vessel (DSM )                              -0.5088        0.1754     -2.901       0.2531 0.1304 1.941
     Primary education captain (Dp )           -0.4887        0.1511     -3.235       0.2545 0.2054 1.239
     Secondary education captain (Ds )             -                  -                -          0.1105 0.2694 0.410
     Non-Yanmar brand of engine (DB )           -                  -                -         -0.2329 0.0930 -2.580
Notes:  1. Estimated coefficients from a truncated normal distribution for technical inefficiency error term and translog
stochastic production frontier. 
2. Coefficients obtained from estimation of Equation  (2) where technical inefficiency is the dependent variable. 3. 
Small vessel: < 5 GRT on west and < 10 GRT on east coast.31
1 Some 200 million people worldwide depend on fishing and fish-related industries for their livelihood. Artisanal
fisheries employ about 24 times as many people as large-scale commercial fisheries and generate almost 50 percent
of total world landings for human consumption (Pauly, 1997). Artisanal fisheries are often the main if not sole
provider of fish for the domestic market. (Lawson, 1984).
2 Immobility of artisanal fisheries labor arises for several reasons. The fundamental reason is the profound
geographical, social, and cultural isolation and consequent marginalization to society.  Their specialized way of life,
evolved to adapt and exploit their unique ecosystem, and job skills further contribute. The geographical isolation
limits educational opportunities, knowledge of opportunities elsewhere, and kinship ties in cities and towns which
would help emigration.
3 Destructive fishing practices include the use of dynamite and cyanide poison to stun or kill fish, and coral mining.
Estuaries, coastal wetlands, bays, and nearshore areas of the sea form breeding grounds and nurseries for juvenile
fish and prawns. Over thirty percent of marine productivity occurs in these marginal areas and yet they comprise only
one percent of the total marine volume (Agardy, 1997). Destruction of these habitats and coral reefs lowers the
environmental carrying capacity and the ultimate size of the fish stocks that can be sustainably harvested. Mangrove
swamps have some of the highest levels of primary biological productivity of any ecosystem, but are harvested for
wood chips and cleared for aquaculture sites. Coral reefs are killed by cyanide, dynamite, or pollution. Over one-half
of the world ￿s salt marshes and mangrove swamps have been cleared or drained for development and ten percent of
the world ￿s coral reefs have been eliminated by human activity (Agardy, 1997).  
4 The conflicts arise from the harvesting of fish which, in tropical waters, tend to be concentrated in coastal areas and
shallow, inshore waters. Moreover, in overfished tropical waters, only the youngest age classes remain, which are
located in nearshore waters. These waters are fished by both artisanal and large-scale vessels, which leads to
conflicts. In many instances, artisanal and large-scale commercial fishers are from different ethnic groups,
exacerbating the conflicts. In addition, larger vessels home port in larger urban areas rather than in the traditional
fishing villages and hamlets strung along the coast. This poses another source of conflict as almost all of the
employment gains associated with large-scale fishing and from modernization of fishing fleets are concentrated in
towns and cities and not in artisanal fishing communities (IPFC, 1994). Large-scale fishers concentrate on
production for urban and export markets (especially prawns for export) while artisanal fishers concentrate on own
consumption and local markets, with only a limited export orientation.
5 Several lessons can be learned from past experiences. First, artisanal fishers are unlikely to transform their fisheries
into large-scale, fully commercialized operations. Second, the gains from introducing motors and upgrading gear are
already largely realized. Third, artisanal fishers and their families are unlikely to depart in mass from their narrow
strip of land and sea to find employment elsewhere inland. Fourth, most fish stocks are fully or over-exploited, which
precludes the introduction of larger-scale production technologies, such as trawl or purse seine nets. Fifth, policies
should be predicated on full and sustainable utilization of the largely renewable resources of the complex and varied
ecosystem in the coastal littoral and nearby fishing grounds. Sixth, sustainable fishery development is often limited
by a yield fundamentally fixed by nature. Seventh, halting or even reversing the extensive ongoing degradation of the
ecosystem is required to maintain the renewable resources upon which artisanal fishing communities survive. 
6 The species of fish commercially exploited, while generally not migratory, are sensitive to major seasonal
variations (Bailey). On the east coast, during and immediately after the northeast monsoon, these species congregate
close to the shoreline, where food is concentrated, and are normally found within 5 miles of the coast, but when the
seas enter the prolong calm, coinciding with decreased river discharge and hence lower nutrient inflow and plankton
growth, the fish tend to disperse over a wider area to forage. In the season of clear water, the decline in water
turbidity signifies lower organic water content and reduced marine life.
7 The translog functional form  ￿  a flexible functional form  ￿   can be interpreted as either a linear-in-parameters,
second-order approximation to an unknown, unspecified, arbitrary, twice-differentiable underlying functional form
or as a true or exact production function. As a flexible functional form, the translog does not a priori restrict the
value of factor substitution elasticities. We interpret the translog as a second-order approximation and subsequent
tests of separability to distinguish the translog from the Cobb-Douglas functional form in order to impose fewer
restrictions on the form of aggregator functions of aggregate inputs or outputs (Blackorby, Primont, and Russell
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1978).
8 Campbell and Hand (1997) discuss the importance of specifying these variables as service flows rather than
assuming that the stocks are in full static equilibrium with proportional service flows. A flow specification increases
the possibility of  multicollinearity for the stochastic production frontier. However, this study is concerned with
estimates of technical efficiency, using predictions of output. Hence, multicollinearity does not raise the same
problem as it would if the study focused on individual parameter estimates, or combinations of them, as for example
in an evaluation of input substitution possibilities.
9 Net length was chosen over mesh size as a more accurate measure of the volume of water swept by the fishing gear.
Specifying mesh size as an additional variable would have increased multicollinearity. Also, GRT-days is scaled by
10 and net-haul-days is scaled by 100 to keep the magnitude roughly comparable to labor-days, number of trips, and
operating distance from shore.
10 Because distance from the fishing ground represents an environmental parameter, it is specified as a single-order
term in the stochastic frontier. An anonymous reviewer noted that this distance variable, OD, is positively correlated
with the measure of vessel size, GRT, on the east coast, suggesting that larger vessels tend to operate further from
shore. This correlation raises the possibility of the east coast results being affected by multicollinearity.  Due to data
limitations, the location or state of the vessel was not recorded and thus area dummy variables, which would
otherwise capture spatial differences in resource abundance, fishing practices, and socio-economic conditions, are
not included in the model. Data limitations also precluded accounting for the type of gill net used.
11 This gives 11 and 13 explanatory variables for east and west coast variables. In addition, all engine brands are
Cumins on the east coast. On the west coast, 31 vessels had Yanmar engines, 1 had Cumins, and the remaining 8
used different (and unspecified) makes. For the west coast, the mean horsepower of Yanmar (non-Yanmar) engines
is 18.15 (11.56) with a standard deviation of 6.92 (7.89) and the minimum is 4 (4) and the maximum is 24 (33). The
distributions indicate that the engine brand dummy variable for non-Yanmar engines is capturing performance
capabilities other than solely a smaller mean horsepower.
12 Other variables, such as kinship ties between the captain and boat owner, could also be included in the inefficiency
function but were excluded because of missing observations. The captain is the primary decision maker on the vessel
(Alam, 1991; Firth, 1975). One way to introduce managerial ability or skipper skill is through fixed or random
effects but this requires panel data and we are confined to cross-sectional data. Instead, we introduce skipper skill
through the technical efficiency measure. Hence, the captain ￿s human capital variables are assumed to affect
production through the technical inefficiency. In the output-oriented technical efficiency approach, this corresponds
to the ability to locate and catch fish (output) given the input bundle. This approach disembodies the managerial
input or  ￿skipper skill ￿ from the skipper ￿s own contribution to labor power (captured in crew size). To account for
inter-vessel differences the best we can, we introduce a small vessel size class dummy into the technical inefficiency
equation. Because vessels on the west coast are smaller than those on the east coast, the small vessel dummy for west
coast vessels corresponds to smaller vessels than on the east coast.
13Any generalized likelihood ratio statistic associated with a null hypothesis involving the ￿³ parameter has a mixed
P
2 distribution because the restriction defines a point on the boundary of the parameter space (Coelli 1996). The
critical values are given in Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). The number of restrictions, and hence the degrees of
freedom for the null hypothesis ￿³ = 0, is the difference in the number of parameters in the test of the OLS model
versus the stochastic production frontier, equal to one for ￿³, one for ￿¼ with the truncated normal (associated with ￿´0,
the intercept of the technical inefficiency function) plus the number of terms in the technical inefficiency function,
excepting ￿´0, which would not enter the traditional mean response function (Battese and Coelli 1995, footnote 6). In
this case, all variables in Z, except ￿´0, would enter the translog production function as control variables, so that the
degrees of freedom for H0: ￿³ = 0 is two.
14 The selected fisheries districts from the east and west coast are available upon request.
15 Not including an intercept parameter (￿´0) in the mean (Z ￿´) may result in the estimators of the ￿´-parameters,
associated with the Z-variables, being biased and the shape of the the distributions of the inefficiency effects, U,
being unnecessarily restricted (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Battese and Coelli (1995) note that when the Z vector has
the value 1 and the coefficients of all other elements of Z are 0, Stevenson ￿s (1980) model is represented. The
intercept ￿´0 in the technical inefficiency function will have the same interpretation as the ￿¼ parameter of Stevenson ￿s
model (Coelli, 1996). The null hypothesis combining null hypotheses one and three into a single null hypothesis,33
given the translog stochastic production frontier and truncated normal, is rejected for both coasts (one percent critical
values are 27.026 with 13 degrees of freedom on the east coast and 29.927 with 15 degrees of freedom on the west
coast). In addition, on the east coast, ￿³ = 0.9999 with a standard error of 0.0001 (Table 3) indicates that the vast
majority of residual variation is due to the inefficiency effect, U, and that the random error, V, is almost zero, while
on the west coast, ￿³ = 0.3380 with a standard error of 0.1372 indicates that random error is relatively more
important.
16 A newer vessel, engine, or net might also be in a better state of repair and maintenance, which could also increase
its efficiency. In addition, in view of the complexities involved in obtaining information on the year of first purchase
or construction of second-hand vessels, their actual age could not be assessed. Instead, estimated remaining
economic life for the asset was chosen. The number of years that the asset has been owned by the present owner was
available, but economic life was deemed a more reliable indicator of capital vintage.
17 A new vessel does not directly contribute to the catch but increases seaworthiness, especially when seas are rough
such as during the monsoon (Bailey). New vessels also tend to be faster and require less general maintenance. Nets
catch the fish. The relative condition of the net affects catch rates; netting in a poor state of repair may have gaping
holes and thread so weakened by age that even a small fish may be able to free itself.
18 These results could reflect measurement error of estimated remaining economic life. Maintenance could also differ
by age but not be accounted for in the sample. Newer vessels could also incorporate experiments or innovations in
hull design that actually inhibit inefficiency. The same result of an unexpected algebraic sign was found for auxiliary
regressions when years of ownership was substituted for expected remaining economic life, providing some evidence
for measurement error. 
19 The results might reflect the proportion of Chinese skippers in the sample. On the east coast,  37/42 of the skippers
are Chinese (which is disproportionate to the population) but west coast the numbers are more even.
20 The limited range of captains ￿ formal education (few captains received secondary education on the west coast and
no fishers on the east coast) may also affect the results.
21The training program might also be inappropriate. The fishers might require a more hands-on, rather than a
government training program. Fishers have considerable local knowledge of conditions and networks of fishing
information are often only developed on the job.
22 A non-owner captain operating in marine fisheries has avenues to demonstrate behavior contrasting to that found
in agriculture. For example, unreported or illegal sales of fish caught can be made at sea. In addition, the percentage
of owner-operators is quite high on both coasts (81% and 77% on the east and west coasts, respectively), which
could affect the results.
23 Selectively removing small vessels would save only a small amount of capital but might benefit the resource stock
by lowering exploitation rates on the younger, sexually immature fish.